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The recent WTO Appellate Body decision in U.S. – Steel Safeguards provided a new 
wrinkle in the AB’s treatment of Regional Trade Agreement members who seek to exempt each 
other from the application of safeguard measures. Previously, the AB had supported a rigorous 
“parallelism requirement” compelling Members to equate the scope of the countries investigated 
with the scope of the countries upon which the safeguard measures would be applied before it 
would consider whether Article XXIV provided an affirmative defense permitting the exclusion 
of RTA partners from the application of such measures. Where there was an impermissible “gap” 
as between the scope of the investigation and ultimate application, the AB would refuse to rule 
on whether an Article XXIV defense was permissible. In U.S. – Steel Safeguards, however, the 
AB went a step further and announced that even where RTA partners are excluded from the 
injury and causation investigation all together, the Member seeking to impose safeguard 
measures must still take into account imports from RTA partners as “other factors” under the 
non-attribution principle in order to exempt its RTA partners. This ruling is, in fact, a new 
additional obligation and is contrary previous AB decisions as it finds the requirements of Article 
XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards to be more important than the requirements under Article 
XXIV.
* The Author is a third-year J.D./M.A. candidate at American University’s Washington College 
of Law and School of International Service in Washington, D.C. The Author may be reached by 
email at jdtaylor@uwalumni.com, by phone at (301) 706-8594, or by mail at 5004 Warren St., 
NW Washington, D.C. 20016.
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On March 5, 2002, President Bush announced the implementation of certain safeguard 
measures1 on a wide range of steel products.2 Pursuant to his authority under § 312(a) of the 
NAFTA Implementation Act and the individualized Free Trade Agreements with Jordan and 
Israel,3 the President declared, however, that the steel safeguard measures would apply to all 
countries except Canada, Mexico, Jordan and Israel.4 Countries all over the world expressed 
great displeasure over the imposition of the steel safeguards hailing the measures as a return to 
protectionism.5 In response to the steel safeguards, the European Union, together with Brazil, 
* The Author is a third-year J.D./M.A. candidate at American University’s Washington College 
of Law and School of International Service in Washington, D.C.
1 See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 14, 1994, Article 2.1 [hereinafter “Agreement on 
Safeguards”] (authorizing imposition of Safeguard measures under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) Article XIX and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
Agreement on Safeguards, where Members are permitted to raise tariffs for a limited period of 
time on specific products if they can demonstrate that an emergency situation exists where those 
products have been imported in such increased amounts so as to cause serious injury or threaten 
to cause such injury to a domestic industry). 
2 See Presidential Proclamation 7529: To Facilitate Positive Adjustment To Competition From 
Imports of Certain Steel Products (March 5, 2002) at ¶ 7 [hereinafter Steel Proclamation] 
(describing different steel products upon which tariffs will be raised, including carbon and alloy 
steel hot bar, cold bar, welded tubular products, carbon and alloy flat-rolled steel, and stainless 
steel fittings, among others), available at 2002 WL 340836. 
3
 19 U.S.C. 3372(a) (1993).
4 See Steel Proclamation at ¶ 11 (excluding Canada, Mexico, Israel and Jordan, all of whom have 
signed Free Trade Agreements with the United States, from the application of steel safeguards). 
5 See Edmund L. Andrews, Angry Europeans to Challenge U.S. Steel Tariffs at W.T.O, March 6, 
2002, N.Y. TIMES (citing a drop in steel imports in the years leading up to the implementation of 
safeguards as one reason the Europeans feel the measure promotes protectionism, and describing 
2China, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, and Switzerland filed separate complaints at 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), which ultimately resulted in an Appellate Body (“AB”) 
decision finding the steel safeguards inconsistent with certain Articles of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) and WTO Agreements.6
One of the key allegations against the U.S. in the steel safeguards case was that WTO 
rules prohibit the exemption of partners in a Regional Trade Agreement (“RTA”) from the 
application of safeguard measures.7 In addressing this issue, this Comment posits that past WTO 
Panels and the Appellate Body (“AB”) have created a rigorous “parallelism requirement” 
whereby WTO Members are bound to match the scope of the safeguards injury investigation to 
the scope of the application of safeguards before a Panel or the AB will even consider whether 
RTA partners can exclude each other from the imposition of such measures. Moreover, the AB 
in U.S. – Steel Safeguards added an additional obligation requiring Members to apply a non-
attribution standard to RTA partner imports when those imports are completely excluded from 
the injury and causation analysis of a safeguards investigation. By endorsing this demanding 
“parallelism requirement,” Panels and the AB have been able to evade the true policy 
consideration at issue: whether RTA partners can exclude each other from the injury and 
South Korean steel producers complaints that the U.S. was engaging in arbitrary discrimination 
by excluding Mexico and Canada from the imposition of steel safeguards). 
6 See U.S. - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248-49, 
251-54, 258-59/AB/R [hereinafter U.S. - Steel Safeguards] (outlining each complaint brought 
against U.S. steel safeguards). 
7 See, e.g., U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS258/9 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by 
New Zealand (claiming the U.S. failed to meet the “parallelism requirement” inherent in the 
Agreement on Safeguards by excluding Canada and Mexico from the application of steel 
Safeguards), and U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS259/10 Request for the Establishment of a 
Panel by Brazil (making the same claim as New Zealand). See also U.S. - Steel Safeguards, 
WT/DS249/6, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Japan, and U.S. - Steel Safeguards, 
WT/DS251/7, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Korea (arguing exclusion of NAFTA 
members from the application of steel safeguards violates the GATT Article I Most Favored 
Nation principle).
3causation investigation and subsequent application of safeguard measures by using an 
affirmative defense under GATT Article XXIV, the provision allowing WTO Members to form 
regional trade alliances. 
Part II of this Comment will examine the inherent conflict between Article XXIV of 
GATT, which allows WTO Members to form RTAs, and Article XIX and the WTO Agreement 
on Safeguards, which regulate the implementation of safeguard measures. In Part III, the use of 
Article XXIV as a defense to GATT-inconsistent measures will be analyzed by looking at past 
Panel and AB decisions in which such a defense has been claimed. Part IV will then discuss the 
AB’s most recent interpretation of the parallelism requirement in U.S. – Steel Safeguards.
II. The Relationship between Article XXIV, Article XIX, and the Agreement on Safeguards
In order to put the issue of intra-regional safeguards application in context, it must first be 
understood that there is an inherent conflict between GATT Articles XIX and XXIV and the 
Agreement on Safeguards (“the Agreement”). Both Articles XIX and XXIV and the Agreement 
must be viewed as exceptions to the general purpose of the WTO found in the GATT Article I 
Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) clause.8 The relationship between these two exceptions comes 
into conflict when a member of an Article XXIV RTA seeks to impose an Article XIX safeguard
on a product, but chooses not to enforce the measure upon other members of the same RTA. The 
trade creation aspects of Article XXIV, therefore, conflict with the trade-distorting protectionism 
of Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards.9 This section will address the problems 
8 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Article I [hereinafter GATT] 
(stating “with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind” imposed on imports or exports 
from a WTO Member, “any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by a Contracting 
Party” must be given “immediately and unconditionally to the like product” going to, or coming 
from any other WTO Member). 
9 See Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials, and Text 465 
(Jackson, John H., Davey, William J., and Sykes, Alan O. Jr. eds., 3d ed. 1995) (explaining 
4created by the inherent conflict between these two exceptions to the general trade-creation 
notions included in the formation of the WTO.10
A. Article XXIV: Regionalism and Trade Creation
Many commentators, as supported by WTO policy, believe that regionalism and the 
creation of RTAs will assist in laying the groundwork for a more integrated global economy.11
As trade-creation is the main goal of the WTO, it would be contradictory if the WTO were to 
disallow regional trading blocs that seek to liberalize trade between Members.12 It is important to 
note, however, that since 1995, the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (“CRTA”) at the 
WTO, which is charged with overseeing RTA compliance with Article XXIV, has failed to 
approve a single RTA.13 The WTO, however, has allowed Members to negotiate and operate 
RTAs without the approval of the CRTA.14
trade-creation as it relates to RTAs as a theory whereby WTO Members can take advantage of 
more efficient suppliers within a regional bloc, and that trade-diverting practices, such as a ban 
on regional trading agreements, would lead firms to use inefficient suppliers from WTO Member 
countries to take advantage of certain trade preferences).
10 See World Trade Organization, Apr. 14, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization [hereinafter WTO] (describing objectives of creating the WTO as the lowering of 
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to eliminate discriminatory treatment in global trade, thus 
creating more trade throughout the world). 
11 See Jackson, Davey, & Sykes, supra note 9, at 467 (arguing regional integration should be 
seen as a “building block” and not a “stumbling block” to a more integrated world economy); see 
also id. at 465 (explaining positive aspects of trade-creation policies).
12 See WTO, supra note 10 (stating trade liberalization as a goal of the WTO).
13 See Work of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm (describing responsibilities of the 
CRTA and noting a lack of consensus as the reason why no RTAs have yet been approved).
14 See Regional Trade Agreements at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (listing 143 RTAs as notified to the 
WTO under Article XXIV and allowing all of them to operate without CRTA approval).
5GATT Article XXIV allows WTO Members to form Free Trade Areas (“FTAs”)15 or 
Customs Unions (“CUs”),16 whereby “duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce . . . 
are eliminated with respect to substantially all trade between the constituent territories.”17 By 
allowing WTO Members to form FTAs or CUs, Article XXIV provides an explicit exception to 
the MFN clause of GATT Article I since those Members that are party to an RTA will apply 
lower tariff rates and reduce other trade regulations between them, but still maintain similar 
trade-distorting policies as to other WTO Members.18
Article XXIV:8, however, includes a list of “exceptions” to the general trade-creation 
rule of Article XXIV, including Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, and XX, permitting RTA 
members to impose, where necessary, measures increasing “duties and other restrictive 
regulations” against other RTA members.19 Conspicuously absent from these exceptions is 
Article XIX, and, thus, the Agreement on Safeguards.20 Questions have arisen within the WTO 
and before Panels and the AB regarding those GATT provisions that do not appear as listed 
exceptions.21 RTA members have argued that their right to exclude members from the 
15 See GATT Article XXIV:8(b) (explaining an FTA to be a group of separate customs territories 
that eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations between them).
16 See GATT Article XXIV:8(a) (defining a CU as a single customs territory created from 
separate customs territories where one set of duties and regulations will apply to all imports and 
exports to and from the CU).
17
 GATT Article XXIV:8 (emphasis added).
18 See Jackson, Davey, & Sykes, supra note 9, at 465 (explaining the difference between policies 
favoring trade-creation and those that create trade-distortion); see also GATT Article XXIV:4 
(discussing relations between RTAs and third-party WTO Members).
19
 GATT Article:8(a)(i) and (b).
20 See Robert E. Hudec and James D. Southwick, Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in 
Regional and Multilateral Negotiations 66 (Miguel Rodrguez Mendoza, Patrick Low, Barbara 
Kotschwar eds., 1999)  (discussing those GATT Articles, including Article XIX, that were left 
off the exceptions list in Article XXIV:8).
21 See id. at 68 (explaining the ramifications of each of the listed exceptions, and noting that in 
addition to Article XIX, Article XXI, the general national security exception to compliance with 
GATT, is also absent from the list of exceptions in Article XXIV:8, but that it would be absurd if 
6application of safeguards exists because Article XIX does not appear on the list of exceptions 
and, therefore, RTA members are expected not to apply safeguard measures against each other as 
such measures would be an increase in “duties and other restrictive regulations.”22 To supporters 
of intra-regional safeguards exemptions, the list of exceptions in Article XXIV:8 represents only 
those GATT provisions that must be imposed on RTA partners when applied at all.23
Opponents to the exclusion of RTA partners from the application of safeguard measures
argue that GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards require a parallelism as between 
the investigation of the imports thought to cause or threaten serious injury and the ultimate 
application of safeguard measures upon those imports. 24 It would, therefore, violate both Article 
XIX and the Agreement to conduct an investigation of all imports, including those from RTA 
members, and then exclude RTA partners from the application of safeguard measures.25
During the Uruguay Round WTO negotiations on Article XXIV, a paper was circulated 
discussing the inherent conflict between Articles XXIV and XIX.26 Although the language was 
rejected as being “too permissive,” the negotiators recognized that “it should be demonstrated [in 
injury investigations] that the serious injury giving rise to the invocation of Article XIX is caused 
RTA members were not be able to escape from obligations for national security reasons); but see 
id. at 67 (noting a GATT Secretariat document stating the drafting history of Article XXIV:8 
demonstrates that Article XIX was left out of the listed exceptions on purpose).
22 Id. at 68 (stating one of the arguments by proponents of RTA exemptions is that the list of 
exceptions in Article XXIV:8 represents only those GATT provisions that must be imposed on 
RTA partners when applied at all); see also Mathis, James H., Regional trade agreements in the 
GATT-WTO: Article XXIV and the internal trade requirement 242 (2002) (recognizing an 
argument that as Article XIX is not a listed exception, RTA members should not be allowed to 
include each other in the application of Safeguard measures).
23
 Mathis supra note 22 at 246.
24
 Hudec & Southwick, supra note 20, at 68.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 68 (discussing a draft decision on Article XXIV proposed on September 24, 1990).
7by imports from non-members [of an RTA].”27 Combined with the arguments proffered by 
opponents to exemptions for RTA partners, this language would suggest that the WTO as a 
whole supports a “parallelism requirement,” whereby those countries included in a safeguards 
injury investigation should be the same countries to which the safeguard measures are applied. 
Instead of endorsing the “parallelism requirement” as a limitation on the investigatory 
procedures of RTA members, however, the AB, as will be explained in Part III, uses it more as a 
hurdle to Members who attempt to argue an affirmative defense under Article XXIV to allow 
RTA exemptions. This tactic may be the result of a conscious decision by the AB to avoid 
having to decide whether an RTA has complied with Article XXIV, a duty assigned to the CRTA 
not the AB.
B. Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards: Emergency Actions Only
GATT Article XIX, as clarified by the later negotiated Agreement on Safeguards (the 
“Agreement”), can also be viewed as an exception to Article I MFN. By allowing WTO 
Members to remedy problems with “fair trade,”28 Article XIX and the Agreement together seek 
to permit increased tariffs for a limited period of time on specific products in emergencies when 
surges in imports are the result of unforeseen developments that were the direct cause of the 
27 Id. at 69; see also id. at 71 (arguing as with Antidumping and Countervailing Duty actions, 
“protective” GATT-inconsistent measures such as Safeguards should only be applied to those 
countries causing the injury and, thus, RTA partners should be exempted from the application of 
such trade-distorting measures if they are not causing the injury).
28
 Meaning a legal increase in imports of a specific product (i.e. those imports that have not been 
spurred on by illegal dumping practices or government subsidies) has caused “serious injury” to 
the domestic industry. See U.S. - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded 
Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Decision at Para. 80 
[hereinafter U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards] (explaining when safeguard measures are permitted, 
they should be used only to combat problems with “fair” trade). 
8increased level of imports.29 WTO Panels and the AB have concluded that the purpose of Article 
XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards is to give WTO Members the ability to create an 
“effective remedy” to protect a domestic industry when faced with an “extraordinary emergency 
situation.”30
At the close of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Agreement on Safeguards emerged 
to provide greater detail than Article XIX as to permissible procedures for the investigation and 
implementation of safeguards.31 The chapeau to the Agreement on Safeguards clearly reads that 
the Agreement seeks only to “clarify and reinforce” the provisions under Article XIX.32 It is 
important to note, however, that as set down in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement, when there is 
a conflict between an original GATT provision, such as Article XIX, and one of the Multilateral 
Agreements of the WTO, such as the Agreement on Safeguards, the provision included in the 
Agreement must prevail over the GATT provision.33
Within the Agreement on Safeguards, there are three relevant provisions to the debate 
over whether RTA partners may exempt each other from the application of safeguards. First, 
Article 2.1 of the Agreement states that a Member is only allowed to impose safeguard measures
where it has determined that the increased imports of a product have caused or threatened to 
cause serious injury to a domestic industry.34 Although the text of this Article has not raised 
29 See GATT Article XIX (allowing safeguard measures when a product is being imported “in 
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to 
domestic producers”); See also supra note 1 (defining safeguard measures).
30 See U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 82-83 
(finding a “natural tension” to exist between the right to impose safeguards remedies and the 
obligation not to impede “fair trade” beyond what is necessary to cure an emergency situation).
31 See WTO supra note 10 (discussing creation of the WTO and the separate agreements 
including the Agreement on Safeguards following the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations).
32
 Agreement on Safeguards, preamble.
33
 WTO, Annex 1A.
34
 Agreement on Safeguards, Article 2.1.
9much controversy, it is the footnote to this provision that affects the imposition of intra-regional 
safeguards. 
Footnote 1 to Article 2.1 reads:
A customs union may apply a safeguard measure as a single unit or on 
behalf of a member State.  When a customs union applies a safeguard 
measure as a single unit, all the requirements for the determination of 
serious injury or threat thereof under this Agreement shall be based on the 
conditions existing in the customs union as a whole.  When a safeguard 
measure is applied on behalf of a member State, all the requirements for 
the determination of serious injury or threat thereof shall be based on the 
conditions existing in that member State and the measure shall be limited 
to that member State.  Nothing in this Agreement prejudges the 
interpretation of the relationship between Article XIX and paragraph 8 of 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994. (emphasis added).
Both sections of footnote 1 to Article 2.1 have been subject to intense scrutiny by Panels 
and the AB.35 The first part of the footnote discusses the application of safeguards by a CU and 
has been used by Panels and the AB to form the “parallelism requirement.”36 The second part of 
the footnote reads: “[n]othing in this Agreement prejudges the interpretation of the relationship 
between Article XIX and paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of GATT 1994.”37 As will be discussed 
in Part III, the meaning of this footnote has been the subject of a great deal of litigation, but from 
the text it can be observed that the drafters of the Agreement, at the very least, recognized the 
inherent conflict between Article XXIV and Article XIX and felt that it was an issue to be 
resolved at a later date either by future WTO negotiations or by the AB.
35 See Sections III.B-D infra (describing Panel and AB decisions scrutinizing Section 2.1 of the 
Safeguards Agreement).
36 See Mathis supra note 22 at 250 (noting that the last sentence of footnote 1 to Article 2.1 
requires parallelism in the investigation and application of safeguards); see also Argentina -
Safeguard Measures on the Import of Footwear, WT/DS121/R, Panel Report at Para. 8.80 
[hereinafter Argentina - Footwear] (describing a parallelism to exist as between the scope of the 
countries investigated and the scope of the eventual application of safeguard measures). 
37
 Agreement on Safeguards, Article 2.1, fn 1.
10
The second important provision of the Agreement on Safeguards is Article 2.2, which 
reads: “[s]afeguard measures shall be applied to a product being imported irrespective of its 
source.”38 This provision is a direct contradiction to the theory that the Agreement permits the 
exclusion of RTA partners from the application of safeguard measures.39 Until the WTO or the 
AB chooses to settle the issue of whether RTA members can exclude each other from safeguard
measures using an affirmative defense under Article XXIV, this provision will continue to permit 
a cause of action by third parties to an RTA when RTA partners are exempted from such 
measures. Article 2.2, therefore, will continue to place the burden on the RTA member invoking 
the safeguard measure to demonstrate why it should be able to exclude its RTA partners from the 
application of safeguard measures.40
The last relevant provision of the Agreement on Safeguards deals with the actual injury 
investigation conducted by a Member. Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement uses the term “increased 
imports” three times, leading opponents to the exclusion of RTA partners from safeguard 
measures to conclude that all imports must be included in the investigation stage, and thus 
imports from RTA members cannot be excluded from either the investigation stage or the 
ultimate implementation of safeguard measures.41
38
 Agreement on Safeguards, Article 2.2.
39 See Mathis supra note 22 at 241 (arguing that due to the MFN implications of Article 2.2, even 
if a safeguards investigation were found to meet the “parallelism requirement,” an Article XXIV 
defense would have be invoked by the RTA member imposing the safeguard in order to exclude 
its partners from the application of the measure).
40 See Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R, Panel 
Report at Para. at Para. 9.57 [hereinafter Turkey - Textiles] (noting that the burden of proof in 
WTO disputes is well settled in that the complaining party must first demonstrate a prima facie
case of a violation of a WTO provision, and then the opposing party may invoke an exception or 
affirmative defense, such as Article XXIV:8, where it must prove the conditions for such a claim 
are met). 
41
 Agreement on Safeguards, Article 4.2. See U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/R, Panel 
Decision at Para. 7.162 (framing Korea’s argument as a failure by the U.S. to meet the 
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Both WTO Panels and the AB, when faced with an affirmative defense under Article 
XXIV arguing for the exemption of RTA partners, have favored enforcement of the “parallelism 
requirement” stemming from Article XIX and Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards to limit such exemptions. The leading cases on Article XXIV defenses will be 
discussed next.
III. The “Parallelism Requirement” and Permissible Defenses Under Article XXIV 
As stated in the footnote to Article 2.1 the drafters of the Agreement on Safeguards did 
not make an explicit clarification of the relationship between GATT Articles XXIV:8 and XIX. 
The interpretation of this relationship must, therefore, be decided upon either in further 
negotiations at the WTO or a by the AB. Prior to U.S. – Steel Safeguards four cases have come 
before Panels and the AB in which a WTO Member has attempted to exercise an Article XXIV 
defense.42 All such attempts failed.43 The AB, however, has refused to make a definitive ruling 
on whether RTA members can be excluded from the application of safeguard measures.44
Although it could be argued that the AB appeared to be leaning toward making an authoritative 
“parallelism requirement” by including Canada and Mexico in the injury investigation but later 
excluding them from the application of safeguard measures).
42 See Turkey - Textiles, WT/DS34/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, Argentina - Footwear, 
WT/DS121/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, U.S. - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Wheat Gluten from the European Communities [hereinafter U.S. - Wheat Gluten], 
WT/DS166/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, 
Appellate Body Report (evaluating use of Article XXIV as a defense to the exclusion of RTA 
partners from the application of safeguard measures).
43 But see U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/R, Panel Report at Para. 7.150 (finding that 
Korea’s inability to prove that the U.S. failed to meet the “parallelism requirement” meant that 
the U.S. had in fact met that requirement). The AB later refused to rule on whether the defense 
existed and declared the Panel’s findings on the issue “moot” and of “no legal consequence.” 
U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 199.
44 See, e.g., U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 199 
(refusing to rule on whether RTA members may exclude each other from the application of 
safeguard measures).
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judgment on the issue, 45 in U.S. – Steel Safeguards the AB instead added a new obligation for 
RTA members when excluding their RTA partners from the safeguards investigation all together 
requiring them to apply the non-attribution standard to “account for the fact that excluded 
imports may have some injurious impact on the domestic industry.”46 The addition of the non-
attribution requirement in the investigation stage will likely have the effect of allowing the AB to 
refuse to find that a Member has met the “parallelism requirement” in all future cases. The AB, 
thus, will be able to continue to sidestep the issue of whether an RTA should be permitted to use 
an affirmative defense under Article XXIV to exclude its RTA partners from the application of 
safeguard measures. 
Prior to evaluating panel and AB decisions regarding intra-regional safeguard 
exemptions, two important points must be acknowledged about procedure and interpretation used 
in the WTO. When discussing WTO Panel and AB decisions it is always important to keep in 
mind that stare decisis is not followed. Both Panels and the AB, however, do often lend great 
weight to past decisions.47 In addition, it begs attention to note that neither Panels nor the AB has 
differentiated between permissible application of intra-regional safeguards within a CU versus an 
FTA, and this Comment will assume for the argument of using an Article XXIV defense, that 
such a defense would be available to all RTA partners whether members of a CU or an FTA.48
45 See id. at Para. 198 (finding an RTA member may meet the “parallelism requirement” when it 
1) excludes RTA members from the safeguards investigation, or 2) provides a “reasoned and 
adequate explanation” as to why the RTA members should be excluded from the application of 
safeguards when they were included in the investigation).
46 U.S. – Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-49, 251-54, 258-59/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at 
Para. 437.
47 See Jackson, Davey, & Sykes, supra note 9, at 263 (noting a principle of public international 
law is not to follow a doctrine of precedent but rather to strive to obtain consistency).
48 See Mathis, supra note 22, at 240 (arguing that Article XXIV:8 on its face does not 
differentiate between FTAs and CUs by necessitating the creation of a “separate legal regime” in 
order to form an FTA, and therefore both CUs and FTAs will be considered as the same in 
13
A. Turkey - Textiles: Article XXIV as a Defense to Certain GATT Provisions
The first case to come before a WTO Panel to discuss Article XXIV as a defense was 
Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products49 (“Turkey - Textiles”). Here, 
India complained that quantitative restrictions placed on textile exports to Turkey adopted in 
order to form a CU between Turkey and the European Union were in violation of GATT Articles 
XI and XIII and the Agreement on Textiles.50 Turkey did not deny the existence of the 
quantitative restrictions, but instead stated what the Panel considered to be an affirmative defense 
under Article XXIV,51 claiming that the existence of a valid EU-Turkey CU would justify the 
measures at issue.52
The Panel first looked to whether the measures at issue were justified by the formation of 
a CU. Here the Panel concluded that nothing in Article XXIV addresses the ability of WTO 
Members to orchestrate their customs or duties regulations in a GATT-inconsistent manner with
respect to other WTO Members.53 As to the present case, the Panel concluded that Turkey was 
not authorized by Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) to put in place new GATT-inconsistent quantitative 
restrictions on textile and clothing products in order to form a CU with the EU.54
claims made under Article XXIV, not separate forms of an RTA); see also id. at 242 (referring to 
arguments in favor of intra-regional safeguards exemptions as applicable to both FTAs and 
CUs).
49
 WT/DS34/R, Panel Report.
50 See Turkey - Textiles, WT/DS34/R, Panel Report at Para. 6.30 (explaining India’s argument 
that WTO Members forming a CU under Article XXIV still had to recognize Article XI:1 with 
respect to trade with third party Members).
51 See id. at Para. 9.57 (noting that the burden of proof in WTO disputes is well settled where the 
complaining party must first demonstrate a prima facie case of a violation of a WTO provision, 
and then the opposing party may invoke an exception or affirmative defense and prove the 
conditions for such a claim are met); see also id. at Para. 9.90 (choosing to analyze Turkey’s 
argument as an affirmative defense).
52 Id. at Para. 9.88. 
53 Id. at Para. 9.156.
54 Id.
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On appeal to the AB, Turkey’s argument was again construed to be an affirmative 
defense under Article XXIV.55 Turkey claimed that the Panel erred in finding that it was not 
allowed to introduce the quantitative restrictions at issue upon the formation of a CU with the 
European Communities.56 The AB upheld the Panel’s final determination that the measures at 
issue could not be instituted, but used different reasoning, finding that Article XXIV could be 
used in this case as a defense where the measures were necessary to the formation of a CU. Thus, 
where Article XXIV is used as an affirmative defense to a GATT-inconsistent measure, the AB 
found that the party invoking the defense must first demonstrate that the RTA has met the 
requirements of Article XXIV, and second show that the measure was necessary to the formation 
of the RTA. 57 By upholding the Panel’s final determination, however, the AB decided it was not 
necessary to evaluate whether the proposed CU met the requirements of Article XXIV.58
Although Turkey never argued that Article XXIV could be used as defense per se, the definitive 
finding by the AB that Article XXIV may, in certain circumstances, be invoked as a defense to 
GATT-inconsistent measures has important ramifications for future cases regarding the 
application of safeguard measures as between RTA partners.59
55 See Turkey - Textiles, WT/DS34/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 42 (referring to 
Turkey’s argument under Article XXIV as an affirmative defense).
56 Id. at Para. 6.
57 Id. at Para. 58. 
58 See id. at Para. 59 (noting that the Panel assumed the CU met the requirements of Article 
XXIV without an explicit evaluation).
59 See id. at Para. 45 (stating GATT 1994 “shall not prevent” the formation of a CU, and “thus, 
the chapeau makes it clear that Article XXIV may, under certain conditions, justify the adoption 
of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions, and may be invoked as a 
possible ‘defense’ to a finding of inconsistency”); see also id. at fn 13: 
“We note that legal scholars have long considered Article XXIV to be an 
‘exception’ or a possible ‘defence’ to claims of violation of GATT 
provisions. An early treatise on GATT law stated: ‘[Article XXIV] 
establishes an exception to GATT obligations for regional arrangements 
that meet a series of detailed and complex criteria.’ (emphasis added) 
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B. Argentina - Footwear: The Introduction of “Parallelism”
1. Panel Decision
Where the issue in Turkey - Textiles involved a CU in the formation stage, in Argentina -
Safeguard Measures on the Import of Footwear60 (“Argentina - Footwear”), the Panel faced the 
issue of whether a member of a CU already notified to the WTO could exclude its RTA partners 
from the application of safeguard measures. Among other complaints against the imposition of 
Argentine safeguards on footwear imports, the European Union claimed that Argentina violated 
the Safeguards Agreement by including imports from MERCOSUR in the injury and causation 
analysis, but ultimately excluded MERCOSUR members from that application of the safeguard 
measures.61
At issue in Argentina - Footwear, according to the Panel, was whether there should be 
“parallelism between, on the one hand, the investigation leading to and, on the other hand, the 
application of safeguard measures.”62 The Panel came to the conclusion that the text of the 
footnote to Article 2.1 reading, “[w]hen a safeguard measure is applied on behalf of a member 
State [by a CU as a whole], all the requirements for the determination of serious injury or threat 
thereof shall be based on the conditions existing in that member State and the measure shall be 
limited to that member State” concerns “by whom” a safeguard measure may be imposed not “to 
(citations omitted) We note also the following statement in the unadopted 
panel report in EEC - Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas, 
DS32/R, 3 June 1993, para. 358: ‘The Panel noted that Article XXIV:5 to 
8 permitted the contracting parties to deviate from their obligations under 
other provisions of the General Agreement for the purpose of forming a 
customs union ...’. (emphasis added)”
60
 WT/DS121/R, Panel Report.
61 Id.
62 Id. at Para. 8.80 (emphasis added by the Panel).
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whom” it may be applied.63 The Panel, therefore, rejected Argentina’s argument that the footnote 
to Article 2.1 permitted it to exclude MERCOSUR partners from the application of safeguard 
measures as the footnote was interpreted to state which countries may apply the safeguards, not
which countries the safeguards may be imposed upon.
The Panel then turned its attention to whether, pursuant to footnote 1 to Article 2.1 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards, a Member is permitted to include RTA partners in the investigation 
portion of a safeguards measure, yet exclude those partners from the application of the 
measure.64 According to the Panel, the footnote to Article 2.1 must be looked at in the context of 
Article 2.2, which provides that “[s]afeguard measures shall be applied to a product being 
imported irrespective of its source.”65 In analyzing Article 2.2, the Panel concluded that when an 
RTA conducts a Member-Specific investigation, any safeguard measures resulting from that 
investigation must be applied on a non-discriminatory basis against products from all sources, 
regardless of whether they originate from inside an RTA to be in accordance with the MFN 
principle of GATT Article I.66 The Panel also rejected Argentina’s argument that the footnote to 
Article 2.1 should be considered an exception to Article 2.2 by concluding that if the drafters of 
the Safeguards Agreement had wanted it to be an exception they would have made it explicit as 
they did in Article 9, the exception in which developing countries are exempted from the 
application of safeguards.67
In concluding the MFN analysis, the Panel for the first time gave definitive support for 
the idea of a “parallelism requirement.” By reading the footnote to Article 2.1 in light of the 
63 Id. at Para. 8.83 (emphasis added by the Panel).
64 Id. at Para. 8.84.
65 Id.
66 Argentina - Footwear, Panel Report WT/DS121/R at Para. 8.84.
67 Id. at Para. 8.85.
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requirements of Article 2.2, the Panel found in the text support for an “implied parallelism 
between the scope of a safeguard investigation and the scope of the application of safeguard 
measures.”68
Argentina also argued before the Panel, based on the findings in Turkey - Textiles, that 
Article XXIV prohibited it from imposing safeguard measures on imports from MERCOSUR 
members.69 As the last sentence of the footnote to Article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement states 
that the Agreement does not prejudge any interpretation as between GATT Articles XIX and 
XXIV:8, and since Article XIX is not a listed exception in Article XXIV:8(a)(i) to eliminate 
“duties and other restrictive regulations” between members of a CU, Argentina argued it should 
be allowed to exempt MERCOSUR members from the imposition of safeguard measures.70 The 
Panel was not swayed by this argument and concluded that Article XXIV:8 does not prohibit 
Argentina from applying safeguard measures to its RTA partners in MERCOSUR.71 The Panel
then came to the final conclusion that in the case of a Member-State- Specific investigation and 
application of safeguard measures, where RTA partners are included in the injury and causation 
investigation, those RTA members may not be exempted from the imposition of safeguards, and 
thus, Argentina was in violation of Article 2 of the Safeguards Agreement by excluding other 
MERCOSUR members from the application of its safeguard measures.72
2. Appellate Body Decision
68 See id. at Para. 8.87 (stating that where a member-state-specific investigation includes imports 
from all sources, that member may not exclude RTA partners, but where a CU-wide 
investigation finds serious injury, safeguards may only be applied to extra-regional Members as 
the intra-regional imports would have been considered part of the domestic industry in the 
investigation).
69 Id.  at Para. 8.93.
70 See id.  (arguing Article XXIV:8 prevented it from applying safeguard measures to other 
members of MERCOSUR).
71 Id. at Para. 8.101.
72 Argentina - Footwear, Panel Report WT/DS121/R at Para. 8.102.
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On appeal, the AB agreed with the Panel’s conclusion that Argentina could not include 
MERCOSUR members in its injury and causation investigation but then exclude them from the 
application of safeguard measures, although the AB offered different legal reasoning.73
Argentina claimed that the Panel had erred by imposing a “parallelism requirement” on the 
application of safeguard measures taken by members of a CU.74 Looking at the present facts, the 
AB first noted that the safeguards at issue were not taken by MERCOSUR on behalf of
Argentina, but rather the measures and investigation were undertaken solely by Argentina.75 As 
it was Argentina, and not MERCOSUR, that was a signatory to the WTO, and therefore the 
Agreement on Safeguards, the AB found that the footnote to Article 2.1 of the Agreement did not 
apply to the safeguards at issue.76 The AB then reversed the legal reasoning and findings of the 
Panel, concluding that the footnote to Article 2.1 did not apply in the present case.77 As to Article 
XXIV, the AB concluded that since the Panel’s reasoning on the Safeguards Agreement was not 
applicable, an analysis of a permissible defense under Article XXIV was not necessary as to the 
safeguards at issue.78
As to the principle of whether an Article XXIV defense could be proffered at all, the AB 
began a trend of refusing to rule on that issue.79 Here, the AB agreed with the Panel that the 
73 Argentina - Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 99.
74 Id.
75 Id. at Para. 106-07.
76 Id. at Para. 108-109.
77 Id.
78 See id. at Para.109 (noting that in Turkey - Textiles, although the AB found that Article XXIV 
could be a defense to certain GATT-inconsistent measures, the defense was only proper when 
invoked by a Member claiming the measure was adopted during the formation of a CU and that 
it was necessary to form the CU). 
79 See, e.g., U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 199, 
and U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS162/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 99 (refusing to rule 
on the general principle of whether RTA members are permitted to exclude each other from the 
application of safeguards).
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injury and causation analysis undertaken by Argentina, which included imports from 
MERCOSUR members, could only result in the application of safeguard measures upon all 
imports, not just those outside of MERCOSUR.80 The AB narrowed its ruling, however, by 
stating that since it did not agree with the Panel’s reasoning where the current issue dealt with a 
CU imposing safeguards on behalf of an RTA member, the AB refused to rule on the general 
principle of whether an RTA member can exclude RTA partners from the application of 
safeguard measures.81
C. U.S. - Wheat Gluten: More Support for the “Parallelism Requirement”
1. Panel Decision
As noted above, both Turkey - Textiles and Argentina - Footwear dealt with the 
relationship of GATT Articles XIX and XXIV and the Agreement on Safeguards as applied to 
CUs. In U.S. - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European 
Communities82 (“U.S. - Wheat Gluten”), a Panel and then the AB would apply the “parallelism 
requirement” to a situation where members of an FTA were excluded from the application of 
safeguard measures. 
Here, the EC claimed that the U.S. violated the “parallelism requirement” as set out in 
Argentina -Footwear by excluding NAFTA members from the application of safeguard measures
when Canada had been included in the injury and causation investigation.83 The U.S. defended 
its actions by claiming that the United States International Trade Commission (“USITC”) had 
engaged in a two-step investigation as required by the Agreement on safeguards and NAFTA 
80 Argentina - Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 113.
81 Id. at Para. 114.
82
 WT/DS166/R, Panel Report.
83 U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS166/R, Panel Report at Para. 8.155-156.
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Article 802.84 The U.S. argued first, that the USITC determined the domestic wheat gluten 
industry suffered serious injury due to a surge in imports from all countries85 in 1996 and 1997.86
Second, as is required under NAFTA Article 802, the U.S. argued that the USITC had looked at 
Canadian imports of wheat gluten alone and determined that they did not cause a serious injury 
to the domestic market.87 The U.S. then concluded that this procedure fulfilled the notion of a 
“parallelism requirement” set out by the AB in Argentina -Footwear as the U.S. believed that the 
Agreement on Safeguards allowed for independent investigations of FTA partners, and does not 
require a single causation analysis that included all WTO Members.88
The Panel defined the present issue as whether the U.S., after completing an investigation 
including imports from all Members, was allowed to exclude Canadian wheat gluten imports 
based upon a second subsequent investigation, finding that although Canadian imports 
constituted a “substantial share” of total imports, they did not “contribute importantly” to the 
serious injury caused by the imports.89 In its initial analysis of the applicable WTO provisions, 
the Panel again came to the conclusion that Articles 2.1 and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards 
84 Id. at Para. 8.157.
85 Id. The U.S. originally argued that this first step produced data confirming that imports from 
the EC were enough to cause serious injury. Later in oral arguments, as outlined in footnote 157 
to the Panel Decision, the U.S. acknowledged that an affirmative determination of serious injury 
under 202(b)(1)(A) of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 included imports from all countries in order to 
determine whether imports have increased. 
86 Id. at 8.157.
87 Id.
88 See id. at Para. 8.157-158 (outlining portion of U.S. argument where it was claimed that the 
relationship of GATT Articles XIX and XXIV:8 and Article 2 of the Agreement on Safeguards 
does not stipulate the “sequencing, or number of causation analyses that may be undertaken” in a 
safeguards investigation).
89 U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS166/R, Panel Report at Para. 8.160; see also NAFTA 
Implementation Act § 311, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3371 (1994) (requiring the USITC to exclude 
NAFTA members from the application of safeguard measures if it is determined that their 
imports do not constitute a “substantial share” of all imports and do not “contribute importantly” 
to the serious injury or threat thereof).
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require symmetry between the scope of the products investigated and the scope of the products to 
which a safeguards measure is applied (i.e. the “parallelism requirement”).90 The Panel
concluded, however, that since Canadian imports were included in the original serious injury 
determination, their later exclusion based on the fact that they did not “contribute importantly” to 
the injury was not enough to prove imports from other countries were still causing serious injury 
to the domestic industry as required by Article 4.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.91 The 
Panel’s ultimate finding on this issue was that the U.S. could not exclude Canada from the 
safeguard measures based on an initial investigation finding serious injury that included imports 
from all sources taking account of Canadian imports, regardless of what a second subsequent 
investigation found.92
In addition to the argument under the Agreement on Safeguards, the U.S. also offered a 
defense under Article XXIV to its exclusion of Canada from the wheat gluten safeguard 
measures.93 Here, the U.S. claimed that its exclusion of Canada was consistent with Article 
XXIV and the footnote to Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, arguing the terms on 
which RTA members treat each other to be determined by Article XXIV not Article XIX or the 
Agreement on Safeguards.94 The Panel began its analysis by acknowledging that WTO 
obligations under Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards are cumulative, i.e. any 
safeguards imposed after the implementation of the Agreement on Safeguards must comply both 
90 See U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS166/R, Panel Report at Para. 8.167-170 (citing the text of 
Articles 2 and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards and the Argentina - Footwear AB decision 
for support).
91 Id. at Para. 8.175.
92 Id. at Para. 8.177.
93 Id. at Para 8.178.
94 See id. (acknowledging the U.S. position that the MFN requirement of Article 2.2 does not 
apply to safeguard measures accorded by CUs or FTAs on goods originating within the RTA).
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with Article XIX and the Agreement.95 It was also acknowledged by the Panel that Article 
XXIV, in some circumstances, may provide a defense to actions that are inconsistent with 
provisions of the GATT, and may also provide a defense to WTO Agreements if Article XXIV is 
found to be incorporated into that Agreement.96
Despite the fact that the U.S. argued Article XXIV provides a general defense to GATT-
inconsistent measures and not specifically to the Agreement on Safeguards, the Panel stated that 
it did not find the last sentence of the footnote to Article 2.1 of the Agreement to only refer to 
Articles XIX and XXIV, and that the symmetry required by the Panel must include reference to 
Articles 2.1 and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards in addition to Article XIX.97 The Panel’s 
final ruling was that the exclusion of Canadian imports from the imposition of safeguard 
measures was inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards as the 
USITC would have had to complete a separate injury investigation excluding Canadian imports 
all together in order to exempt Canada from the application of safeguard measures.98 Once again 
the panel made note that it was deciding not to rule on the general principle of whether a member 
of an RTA can exclude imports from its RTA partners from the imposition of safeguard 
measures.99
2. Appellate Body Decision
On appeal, the U.S. claimed that the Panel incorrectly interpreted Articles 2.1 and 4.2 of 
the Agreement on Safeguards, and that it failed to take “sufficient account” of the second 
95 Id. at 8.179.
96 U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS166/R, Panel Report at Para. 8.180; see also Turkey - Textiles, 
WT/DS34/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 45 (finding chapeau of Article XXIV:5 only to 
incorporate provisions of GATT 1994, and not separate WTO Agreements).
97 U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS166/R, Panel Report at Para 8.181.
98 Id. at Para. 8.182.
99 Id. at Para. 8.183.
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subsequent investigation of Canadian imports.100 The U.S. also argued that the Panel erred in 
declining to address the legal significance of the footnote to Article 2.1 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.101 Before analyzing the claims by the U.S., the AB observed that the word “product” 
as it appears in both Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement should be ascribed the same meaning, and 
thus, “[t]o include imports from all sources in the determination that increased imports are 
causing serious injury, and then to exclude imports from one source from the application of the 
measure, would be to give the phrase ‘product being imported’ a different meaning in Articles 
2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.”102 The AB, therefore, found that under general 
circumstances, imports included in the investigations conducted under Articles 2.1 and 4.2 
should correspond to the imports included in the application of safeguard measures under Article 
2.2, again supporting the “parallelism requirement.”103
In coming to its final decision, the AB found that although the USITC provided a 
separate investigation of Canadian imports, it did not make any explicit determinations that 
increased imports from sources outside NAFTA satisfied the requirements of Articles 2.1 and 4.2 
of the Agreement on Safeguards.104 The AB then concluded that the second subsequent 
investigation of Canadian imports was not sufficient to support an exclusion of Canada from the 
application of the safeguard measures put in place by the U.S.105 As to a general Article XXIV 
defense, the AB agreed with the Panel that the issue was not raised properly by the U.S., and 
therefore, again declined to rule on the issue.106
100 U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS166/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 94.
101 Id.
102 Id. at Para. 96.
103 Id.
104 Id. at Para. 98.
105 Id. at Para. 98.
106 U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS166/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 100.
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D. U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards: Prerequisites to the “Parallelism Requirement”
In U.S. - Wheat Gluten, the AB demonstrated a dogged willingness to accept a rigorous 
“parallelism requirement.” A Panel was next faced, however, with the issue of defining the 
necessary prerequisites to meet that requirement. In U.S. - Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Steel Line Pipe from Korea, 107 (“U.S. - Line Pipe 
Safeguards”) the Panel and AB disagreed on whether the U.S. had met the “parallelism 
requirement,” the AB, however, qualified the necessary conditions that would need to be met in 
order to comply with that requirement.108
1. Panel Decision
In evaluating Korea’s claim that U.S. line pipe safeguards were illegal because they were 
not applied to NAFTA members, the Panel bifurcated its analysis and considered arguments 
under Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement separately.109 With respect to violations of 
Article XIX and the Agreement, Korea’s argument was that in applying safeguards in a 
discriminatory manner, the U.S. was violating the general MFN principle set out in GATT 
Article I.110
As to Korea’s claim of an MFN violation under Article XIX, the U.S. offered a defense 
under Article XXIV.111 Here, the Panel first concluded that since the line pipe safeguards 
instituted a tariff-quota, they must be treated as a “duty or other restrictive regulation of 
commerce” under Article XXIV:8(b).112 The Panel then found that Article XXIV:5 authorizes 
the elimination of such restrictions if NAFTA has 1) complied with Article XXIV:5(b) and 
107
 WT/DS202/R, Panel Report.
108 See Section III.D.2 (explaining the conclusions of the AB).
109 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/R, Panel Report at Para. 7.135.
110 Id. at Para. 7.136.
111 Id. at Para. 7.137.
112 Id. at Para. 7.141.
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(c),113 and 2) has eliminated duties and other restrictions on “substantially all” trade between 
members, where the burden was on the U.S. to prove these conditions prevail.114 Acknowledging 
Korea’s claim that the U.S. was not in compliance with Article XXIV:8 as the WTO CRTA had 
not yet issued a final decision on NAFTA, the Panel nonetheless found that the information 
provided by the U.S. was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that NAFTA was in 
compliance with Article XXIV:5(b) and (c), and Korea’s claim under Article XXIV:8 was not 
enough to rebut this assertion.115 The Panel, therefore, concluded that the U.S. was entitled to a 
defense under Article XXIV to Korea’s claim under Article XIX.116
Next, the Panel moved on to consider whether Article XXIV was available to the U.S. as 
a defense under the Agreement on Safeguards. Korea argued that the exclusion of NAFTA 
members from the application of line pipe safeguards violated Article 2.2 of the Agreement.117
Here, the Panel first concluded that as it had already found the U.S. was permitted to rely on an 
Article XXIV defense under Article XIX, it would be “incongruous” not to allow the U.S. to rely 
on a similar defense with respect to the Agreement on Safeguards.118  This conclusion had its 
113 See GATT Article XXIV:5(b) and (c) (setting out basic prerequisites necessary to form an 
FTA or an interim agreement, including MFN requirements and the creation of a schedule to 
conclude formation).
114 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/R, Panel Report at Para. 7.141-142.
115 Id. at Para. 7.144.
116 Id. at Para. 7.146; see also id. at Para. 7.148 (explaining that in Turkey - Textiles the AB had 
conditioned an Article XXIV defense upon not only compliance with Article XXIV:5 and 8, but 
also upon the necessity of the measure to the formation of the CU or FTA). Here, the Panel 
found the second requirement not to apply to cases involving FTAs as the “elimination of ‘duties 
and other restrictive regulations of commerce’ between parties to a free-trade area . . . is the very 
raison d'être of any free-trade area. If the alleged violation of GATT 1994 forms part of the 
elimination of ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce,’ there can be no question of 
whether it is necessary for the elimination of ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce’ (in the case of an FTA).” Id.
117 Id. at Para. 7.149.
118 Id. at Para. 7.150.
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foundation in the intimate relationship between Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards, 
which would not allow a “contrary interpretation.”119
For the Panel, the legal reasoning supporting the use of an Article XXIV defense to the 
Safeguards Agreement found its basis in the Agreement itself. The Panel noted that Article 1, 
“establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures which shall be understood to mean 
those measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994,” which was found by the Panel to 
signify that safeguard measures taken under the Agreement are, in fact, Article XIX measures as 
well.120 The Panel then found that ignoring this provision of Article 1 would deny the fact that 
measures taken under the Agreement and those taken under Article XIX are “essentially the one 
and the same thing.”121
Since the Panel found that measures taken under Article XIX and the Agreement on 
Safeguards were one and the same, it also concluded the last sentence of footnote 1 to Article 
2.1122 provided evidence that Article XXIV could be used as a defense to the Agreement on 
Safeguards as well as Article XIX.123 Here, the Panel concluded that the AB findings in 
Argentina - Footwear did not support Korea’s argument that the last sentence of footnote 1 to 
Article 2.1 only applied to CUs and not FTAs.124 The Panel then found that even though the 
footnote was placed in Article 2.1, the words “[n]othing in this Agreement,” demonstrated that 
119 Id.
120 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/R, Panel Report at Para. 7.150.
121 Id.
122 See Agreement on Safeguards, Article 2.1, fn 1 (“Nothing in this Agreement prejudges the 
interpretation of the relationship between Article XIX and paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of 
GATT 1994”).
123 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/R, Panel Report at Para. 7.151.
124 See id. at Para. 7.153 (holding “[t]hus, even though the first three sentences of footnote 1 
address the application of safeguard measures in the context of a customs union, the broader 
reference in the last sentence to paragraph 8 extends the coverage of that last sentence to include 
the application of safeguard measures in the context of free trade areas, as defined by Article 
XXIV:8(b)”).
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the last sentence applies to the entire Agreement on Safeguards and is not limited in its 
application to Article 2.1 alone.125 A definitive finding was then made by the Panel that as it had 
already concluded that Article XXIV was a proper defense to certain claims brought under 
Article XIX, and since it found that the last sentence footnote to Article 2.1 applies to the entire 
Agreement on Safeguards, including Article 2.2, Article XXIV can therefore provide a defense 
to claims under Article 2.2 of the Agreement.126
The Panel then turned its attention to Korea’s claim that the U.S. failed to fulfill the 
“parallelism requirement” by including NAFTA members in the injury and causation 
investigation, but then excluded them from the application of the safeguard measures.127 In its 
defense, the U.S. offered evidence in the form of footnote 168 to the USITC’s injury and 
causation determination, which stated that the Commission would have reached the same 
conclusion had it excluded NAFTA imports from its investigation.128 Korea’s response was 
restricted in that it claimed only that footnote 168 “has no legal significance.”129 Perplexed by 
the limited argument proffered by Korea, the Panel, citing to the AB decision in U.S. - Wheat 
Gluten, concluded that it could only uphold Korea’s claim of a “parallelism requirement” 
violation if Korea could make out a prima facie case that the U.S. “had excluded imports from 
Canada and Mexico from the line pipe measure, without establishing explicitly that imports from 
125 Id. at Para. 7.157.
126 See id. at Para. 7.158 (noting that any other conclusion would not allow Article XXIV to be a 
defense to Article 2.2 of the Agreement, which would be antithetical to the conclusion that the 
last sentence of footnote 1 to Article 2.1 prohibits Article 2.2 from having such an effect); see 
also id. at Para. 7.160 (discussing Korea’s argument that an Article XXIV defense to the 
Agreement on Safeguards would violate the general interpretive note of Annex 1A to the WTO 
Charter, and inferring the last sentence of footnote 1 to Article 2.1 to mean that Article 2.2 
cannot affect the ability of a Member to claim an Article XXIV defense to claims under that 
Article).
127 Id. at Para. 7.162.
128 Id. at Para. 7.169.
129 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/R, Panel Report at Para. 7.170.
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sources other than Canada and Mexico satisfied the conditions for the application of a safeguard 
measure.”130 Since Korea had failed to make an adequate rebuttal, arguing only that footnote 168 
had “no legal significance,” the Panel rejected Korea’s claim that the U.S. had violated the 
“parallelism requirement,” and thus allowed the U.S. to prevail on an Article XXIV defense.131
2. Appellate Body Decision
On appeal Korea claimed that the Panel used a “flawed” standard by which to evaluate its 
prima facie case that the U.S. had not met the “parallelism requirement.”132 In addressing this 
claim, the AB first noted that the “parallelism requirement” is derived from the parallel language 
found in Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards referring to “product[s] . . . being 
imported.”133 The AB then went through the reasoning behind the “parallelism requirement” 
explaining: 
As we then stated in US – Wheat Gluten, “the imports included in the 
determinations made under Articles 2.1 and 4.2 should correspond to the 
imports included in the application of the measure, under Article 2.2.” We 
added that a gap between imports covered under the investigation and 
imports falling within the scope of the measure can be justified only if the 
competent authorities “establish explicitly” that imports from sources 
covered by the measure “satisf[y] the conditions for the application of a 
safeguard measure, as set out in Article 2.1 and elaborated in Article 4.2 of 
the Agreement on Safeguards.” And, as we explained further in US –
Lamb, in the context of a claim under Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards, “establish[ing] explicitly” implies that the competent 
authorities must provide a “reasoned and adequate explanation of how the 
facts support their determination.”134
The defense proffered by the U.S. centered on the fact that Korea had failed to establish a 
prima facie case that footnote 168 the USITC’s determination did not satisfy the “parallelism 
130 Id. at Para. 7.171.
131 Id.
132 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 184.
133 Id. at Para. 179-80; see also supra Section III.C.2 (discussing conclusions of AB in U.S. -
Wheat Gluten).
134 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 181 
(emphasis added by the AB).
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requirement” as set out by the AB.135 In analyzing the facts, the AB first noted that the USITC 
had included imports from all sources in its injury investigation, yet had excluded NAFTA 
members from the application of safeguard measures, thus creating the impermissible “gap” 
between the imports used in the investigation of serious injury and the imports affected by the 
measure at issue.136 The AB, therefore, concluded that the existence of such a gap as proven by 
Korea was sufficient to make out a prima facie case that the U.S. had violated the “parallelism 
requirement.”137
After assessing the contents of footnote 168, the AB concluded that it did not “establish 
explicitly” that increased imports from outside of NAFTA could have caused serious injury or 
threat of serious injury on their own.138 It was also found that footnote 168 failed to “provide a 
reasoned and adequate explanation” of facts that could establish imports from non-NAFTA 
members were causing serious injury or threatened to cause such injury to the relevant domestic 
market.139 To be explicit, the AB explained, “a statement must express distinctly all that is 
meant; it must leave nothing merely implied or suggested; it must be clear and unambiguous.”140
The AB then concluded that footnote 168 could not be considered to have met either the 
“explicit” or “reasoned and adequate explanation” obligation necessary to demonstrate that only 
135 Id. at Para. 185.
136 Id. at Para. 186.
137 Id. at Para. 187. The AB also found that placing the burden on Korea to rebut the information 
found in footnote 168 of the USITC’s determination would be an impossible burden to fulfill as 
neither Korea, nor any other Member in a similar situation, would have the resources available to 
conduct a separate injury and causation investigation. Id.
138 Id. at Para. 194.
139 Id.
140 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 194.
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imports from non-NAFTA countries caused or threatened to cause serious injury to the domestic 
line pipe market, and therefore the U.S. failed to rebut the prima facie made out by Korea.141
In its final conclusions on the appeal by Korea, the AB found that the U.S., by failing to 
rebut Korea’s prima facie case had violated Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards as 
the line pipe safeguards were not applied in a manner consistent with the “parallelism 
requirement.”142
As the issue of whether a member of an RTA could exclude other RTA partners from the 
application of safeguard measures became moot under the reasoning applied to the rebuttal 
offered by the U.S., the AB refused to rule on whether Article XXIV is a permissible defense to 
Article 2.2 in such situations.143 The AB did, however, note two circumstances where Article 
XXIV could be considered an exception to Article 2.2, including: 1) where the imports exempted 
from the application of the safeguard measures are not considered in the injury and causation 
investigation, or 2) the exempted imports are included in the investigation, but the Member 
seeking to impose the safeguards has “established explicitly, through a reasoned and adequate 
explanation, that imports from sources outside the free-trade area, alone, satisfied the conditions 
for the application of a safeguard measure, as set out in Article 2.1 and Article 4.2.”144
Based upon its conclusions the AB chose not to rule on the issue of whether an Article 
XXIV defense was available to the U.S. as to the exemption of NAFTA members from the 
application of the line pipe safeguards.145 By modifying the conclusions of the panel as to the 
141 Id. at Para. 195.
142 Id. at Para. 197.
143 Id. at Para. 199.
144 Id. at Para. 198 (emphasis added).
145 Id. at 199.
31
relationship of Article XXIV to the Agreement on Safeguards, and the Article XXIV defense in 
general, the AB decided to declare those findings “moot and as having no legal effect.”146
E. The State of the “Parallelism Requirement” Prior to U.S. – Steel Safeguards
An analysis of the above Panel and AB decisions on safeguards exemptions for RTA 
partners provides three main themes. First, both Panels and the AB have construed the 
Agreement on Safeguards to require parallelism as between the scope of the countries involved 
in the safeguards investigation and the application of any measures resulting from that 
investigation.147 Second, Panels and AB have also confirmed that Article XXIV, under certain 
circumstances, may provide a defense to measures that are GATT-inconsistent.148 And third, the 
AB has made several explicit refusals to rule on whether Article XXIV can provide a defense in 
the form of an exception from obligations arising under Article 2.2 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.149
As is clearly stated by the AB in U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards, an affirmative defense 
under Article XXIV, where Article XXIV can be viewed as an exception to Article 2.2 of the 
Agreement, is available under two circumstances.150 First, where an RTA member excludes its 
RTA partners from the investigation of imports that may cause serious injury, Article XXIV may 
provide an affirmative defense allowing exclusion of RTA partners from safeguard measures. 
146 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 199.
147 See, e.g., U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 181 
(defining the “parallelism requirement” and explaining the impermissible “gaps” as between the 
scope of the investigation and implementation of safeguard measures).
148 See, e.g., Turkey – Textiles, WT/DS34/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 45 (concluding 
that Article XXIV can be used as a defense to certain GATT-inconsistent measures).
149 See, e.g., U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 199, 
and U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS162/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 99 (refusing to rule 
on the general principle of whether RTA members are permitted to exclude each other from the 
application of safeguards).
150 U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 198.
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Second, if there is a “gap” between the scope of the countries involved in the investigation and 
the subsequent WTO Members upon which safeguard measures are imposed, 151 the Member 
must explicitly establish that imports from outside RTA caused or threatened to cause serious 
injury through a reasoned and adequate explanation in order to exempt its RTA partners.152
No case has come before a Panel, however, where a Member has been found to meet the 
above stated rigorous “parallelism requirement.”153 Moreover, the AB continues to refuse to rule 
on whether, even if a country met the “parallelism requirement,” Article XXIV could then be 
used as defense to allow the exemption of RTA partners from the application of safeguard 
measures. 154 Were a Member to meet the “parallelism requirement,” however, it is reasonable to 
assume that the qualifications for applying an Article XXIV defense as laid out in Turkey -
Textiles would be in effect.155 This would mean that the Member would have to demonstrate 1) 
that the RTA seeking to exclude members has met the requirements of Article XXIV:(5)(a) and 
151 See id. at Para. 181 (explaining the impermissible “gap” between the investigation and the 
implementation of safeguard measures).
152 Id. at Para. 198; See also Mathis supra note 22 at 250 (arguing a “parallelism requirement” 
opens the door to an argument where the exclusion of RTA partners from the application of 
safeguard measures would not harm non-members to the RTA).
153 But see U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/R, Panel Report at Para. 7.171 (finding that 
the U.S. to have met the “parallelism requirement” as Korea failed to rebut the proposition that 
non-NAFTA imports were causing or threatening to cause serious injury). This conclusion was 
modified and found moot and of no legal effect on appeal to the Appellate Body. See U.S. - Line 
Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 199.
154 See, e.g., U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 199, 
U.S. - Wheat Gluten, WT/DS162/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 99 (refusing to rule on 
the general principle of whether RTA members are permitted to exclude each other from the 
application of safeguards); see also Mathis supra note 22 at 241 (noting exclusion of RTA 
partners from the imposition of Safeguards members, whether or not there is parallelism as 
between the investigation and application of the measures, requires the RTA member invoking 
the measure to claim an Article XXIV defense to prevail in front of a WTO Panel).
155 Turkey - Textiles, WT/DS34/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 58.
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(8)(a) (i.e. the RTA is generally in compliance with Article XXIV), and 2) show that the 
formation of the RTA would have been blocked had the measure at issue not been included.156
As mentioned above in Part II.A, the refusal by the AB to rule on the ability of Members 
to utilize Article XXIV as a defense may result from a fear that a decision concluding that a 
Member has met the “parallelism requirement” would then require the AB to inquire as to 
whether the RTA has complied with Article XXIV under the Turkey - Textiles test. As the CRTA 
has not been able to reach a consensus on the issue of whether any RTA has met all Article 
XXIV requirements, the AB may be uneasy about making any conclusions not yet reached by 
that committee. 
IV. U.S. - Steel Safeguards and the “Parallelism Requirement”
A. Steel Safeguards, the “Parallelism Requirement,” and an Article XXIV Defense
The most recent injury investigation of the U.S. domestic steel industry conducted by the 
USITC looked at a total of thirty-three steel products to see whether increased imports were 
causing or threatening to cause serious injury.157 Pursuant to § 311 of the NAFTA 
Implementation Act, the Commission made affirmative determinations that seven Mexican 
products and five Canadian products accounted for a “substantial share” and “contributed 
importantly” to the injury found in the U.S. steel industry.158 In addition, the USITC found steel 
imports from Israel and Jordan to be so small so as not to affect the “reasoned analysis” required 
156 Id.; see also Argentina - Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 109 
(reaffirming use of an Article XXIV affirmative defense as reasoned in Turkey - Textiles). 
157
 USITC Press Release, ITC Details its Determinations Concerning Impact of Imports of Steel 
on U.S. Industry, October 23, 2001, available at http://www.usitc.gov/er/nl2001/ER1023Y1.PDF
158 Id.
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under Article 3.1 of the Safeguards Agreement and, thus, should be excluded from the 
investigation and subsequent application of any safeguard measures.159
Throughout the Commission’s report, injury determinations were made with respect to 
each steel product followed by a separate and distinct section delineating the Commission’s 
findings as to whether imports from Mexico and Canada constituted a “substantial share” and 
“contributed importantly” to the injury.160 The specificity of the USITC steel investigation as to 
the effect of NAFTA imports marks a drastic change in the injury determination process under § 
311 that was applied in the investigations at issue in U.S. - Wheat Gluten and U.S. - Line Pipe 
Safeguards, which included a second subsequent investigation of Canada and a simple 
explanation contained in a footnote, respectively.161
As is permitted under § 312 of the NAFTA Implementation Act, the President expanded 
the exemption of products from NAFTA members with respect to the application of safeguard 
measures by excluding all steel products from those countries.162 In response, all eight 
complaints against the U.S. steel safeguards at the WTO argued that the U.S. has failed to meet 
the “parallelism requirement” in the application of the steel safeguards in violation of the 
159 U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-249, 251-254, 258-259, Executive Summary of the U.S. 
First Written Submission, October 11, 2001 at Para. 82.
160 See generally USITC Investigation No. TA-201-73 STEEL at 2-225 (examining steel imports 
from NAFTA members pursuant to § 311 of the NAFTA Implementation Act and whether they 
caused or threatened to cause serious injury where a “substantial share” of imports from NAFTA 
members would occur if a producer was considered to be “among the top 5 suppliers” of the 
products in question during the last three years and whether those products “contributed 
importantly” to the injury by looking to see if they were “an important cause, but not necessarily 
the most important cause”); see also U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-249, 251-254, 258-259, 
Written Rebuttal of the U.S., November 26, 2002 at Para. 151 (stating in its injury investigation 
the USITC “expressly separated and distinguished the price and volume effects of non-NAFTA 
imports from those of NAFTA imports as an integral part of the [sic] its parallelism analysis”).
161 See supra Sections III.C.1, III.D.1 (discussing investigations undertaken by the USITC 
resulting in the exclusion of Mexico and Canada from the application of safeguards in each 
case).
162 Supra note 4.
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Agreement on Safeguards and GATT Article XIX:1.163 The complaining parties argue that the 
President’s determination “failed to respect the requirement of parallelism between the scope of 
the investigation of injury and the scope of the safeguard measures.”164
In answering the complaints, the U.S. argued that the USITC’s determination with 
separate and distinct sections delineating the effects of NAFTA steel imports complies with the 
“parallelism requirement” and, thus, allows the U.S. to exclude those imports from the 
application of safeguard measures.165 The U.S. claimed that the USITC made the necessary 
determinations that: 1) for each product, imports from outside NAFTA caused serious injury or 
threat thereof; 2) for those imports from countries other than Canada and Mexico causing or 
threatening to cause injury, the USITC provided a description of the increase in such imports and 
linked them to the cause or threat of serious injury to the domestic steel industry; and 3) for the 
particularized causation analysis, the USITC did not take into account imports from NAFTA 
members and still found a causal-link between non-NAFTA imports and serious injury or threat 
thereof.166 As a result, the U.S. claimed that it satisfied the “parallelism requirement” under the 
Agreement on Safeguards as stated by the AB in U.S. - Line Pipe Safeguards, as the USITC 
completed a “reasoned and adequate explanation” of why NAFTA members should be excluded 
from the application of the steel safeguards.167
163 See supra note 7 (explaining complaints filed at WTO against U.S. steel safeguards).
164 See U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-249, 251-254, 258-259, Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by Brazil, China, EC, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, and 
Switzerland (claiming that the U.S. violated the “parallelism requirement” as set out in the 
Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX).
165 U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-249, 251-254, 258-259, Written Rebuttal of the U.S., 
November 26, 2002 at Para. 158.
166 Id. at Para. 160-161.
167 Id. at Para. 166.
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In addition to the “parallelism requirement” challenges to the steel safeguards, assertions 
from Japan and Korea stated that MFN principles in the WTO prevent the exclusion of RTA 
partners from the application of safeguards remedies.168 In reply, the U.S. has proffered an 
affirmative defense under Article XXIV, which it claims creates an exception to Article I MFN 
and thus allows the exemption of RTA partners from safeguards applications.169 The U.S. relied
on two arguments. First, the U.S. asserted  that since the last sentence of footnote 1 to Article 2.1 
of the Agreement on Safeguards, which refuses to prejudge any interpretation of the relationship 
between Articles XXIV and XIX, does not make the exclusion of NAFTA imports inconsistent 
with the GATT or the Agreement.170 Moreover, the U.S. argued that the USITC complied with § 
311 of the NAFTA Implementation Act, which permits exclusion of NAFTA imports from 
safeguard measures if they do not account for a “substantial share” of imports and do not 
“contribute importantly” to the finding of serious injury.171
B. Panel Decision 
Basing its decision on past Panel and AB reports, the U.S. – Steel Safeguards panel 
concluded that the U.S. violated the parallelism requirement by excluding imports from Canada, 
Mexico, Israel and Jordan from the application of safeguard measures after including imports 
from those countries in its investigation without establishing explicitly with a reasoned and 
adequate explanation why those imports did not cause or threaten injury to the domestic steel 
industry.172 In addition, the Panel found that the U.S. should have applied the non-attribution 
168 U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-249, 251-254, 258-259, Executive Summary of the U.S. 
First Written Submission, October 11, 2001 at Para. 118.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at Para. 119.
172 U.S. – Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-249, 251-254, 258-259/R, Panel Report at Paras. 10.601-
10.696.
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principle to imports excluded from the application of safeguard measures.173 According to the 
panel: 
“[t]he obligation of non-attribution comprises the obligation to separate 
and distinguish the respective effects of increased imports and other 
factors to discern whether there is a genuine and substantial relationship of 
cause and effect between increased imports and serious injury . . . the 
effects of increased imports from all sources and the effects of increased 
imports only from a subset of sources will not necessarily be the same. 
Therefore, it potentially makes a difference whether one compares the 
effects of all increased imports or the effects of only some increased 
imports with the effects of other factors. . . The competent authority is 
under an obligation to account for the fact that excluded (FTA) imports 
contributed to the serious injury suffered by the domestic industry in 
establishing whether imports from sources covered by the measure satisfy 
the requirement of causing serious injury.”174
It can be understood from this language that the panel would not distinguish between the 
two situations discussed in U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards as to the application of the non-
attribution principle. The USITC, therefore, would be required to engage in a non-attribution 
discussion whether it 1) excluded all U.S. RTA partners from its safeguards investigation from 
the beginning; or 2) attempted to establish explicitly with a reasoned and adequate explanation as 
to why U.S. RTA partners that were included in the injury investigation were excluded from the 
application of safeguard measures.
C. Appellate Body Decision
On appeal the U.S. argued the Panel had erred in its final decision by relying on “two 
general conclusions in its introductory analytical section that served as the basis for its product-
173 See id .at Para. 10.604 (finding, “the requirement of causation in Articles 2.1 and 4.2(b) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards, including the requirement of non-attribution, has not been satisfied.”)
174 Id. at Paras. 10.605-10.606 (emphasis in original).
38
specific analyses.”175 The first of these general conclusions was the requirement of a non-
attribution inquiry to “account for the fact that excluded imports may have some injurious impact 
on the domestic industry.”176 The second general conclusion, that the U.S. was required to 
establish explicitly that imports from the countries upon which the safeguard measures were 
applied satisfy the conditions to apply such measures, was misconstrued by the Panel to require 
the USITC to make “redundant findings” for each product. Before addressing the issues on 
appeal, the AB started by noting that the USITC did, in fact, consider imports from all countries 
during its investigation yet ultimately excluded Canada, Mexico, Jordan and Israel from the 
application of the safeguard measures.177 The USITC, according to the AB, therefore, was 
required to establish explicitly that imports from countries outside NAFTA, Jordan and Israel 
alone satisfied the requirements for the application of safeguard measures.178
The first issue addressed by the AB was whether the Panel erred by concluding that the 
USITC was required to account for the fact that excluded imports, i.e. those from Canada, 
Mexico, Jordan and Israel, may have an injurious effect on the domestic steel industry.179 The 
AB understood the U.S. to be arguing that the panel had gone “further” than the requirement laid 
out in U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards by establishing a requirement that had no basis in the 
Safeguards Agreement for “a separate analysis of imports from sources not subject to the 
safeguards measure, according to which the competent authority must ‘affirmatively account for 
175 U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-249, 251-254, 258-259/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at 
Para. 437.
176 Id.
177 Id. at Para. 444.
178 Id.
179 Id. at Para. 446.
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the effect of such imports.’” 180 Thus, the U.S. argued that the Panel, by requiring the USITC to 
“account for the fact that excluded imports may have some injurious impact on the domestic 
industry,” was adding an “extra analytical step with respect to parallelism,” and that nothing in 
the Safeguards Agreement requires a “distinct or explicit analysis of imports from sources not 
subject to the measure.”181
The AB began its analysis of the issue by discussing the non-attribution requirement as 
found in Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement. Here, the AB noted that the last sentence of 
Article 4.2(b) requires the competent authority, when determining a causal link between 
increased imports and serious or threatened serious injury to the domestic industry, must not 
attribute factors other than increased imports determined to cause injury to the increased 
imports.182 The AB, therefore, determined that imports excluded from the application of 
safeguard measures must be considered factors other than increased imports under Article 4.2(b), 
and, thus, the “possible injurious effects that these excluded imports may have on the domestic 
industry must not be attributed to imports included in the [application of] safeguard 
measure[s].”183
The AB went on to find that the non-attribution requirement is part of the “overall 
requirement incumbent on the competent authority” to establish a “causal link” between 
increased imports and serious injury. As the AB understood U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards, under 
the last sentence of Article 4.2(b), the competent authorities must “establish explicitly, through a 
180 Id.; See also id. at FN 439 (noting Canada’s third party submission as supporting the U.S. 
argument that the panel erred in “reading US – Line Pipe to mean that parallelism necessarily 
requires the competent authority to account for the fact that excluded imports may have some 
injurious impact on the domestic industry.”).
181 U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-249, 251-254, 258-259/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at 
Para. 447 (emphasis in original).
182 Id. at Para. 449.
183 Id. at Para. 450.
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reasoned and adequate explanation, that injury caused by factors other than increased imports is 
not attributed to [the] increased imports.”184 Thus, “[i]n order to provide such a reasoned and 
adequate explanation, the competent authority must explain how it ensured that it did not 
attribute the injurious effects of factors other than included imports - which subsume ‘excluded 
imports’ - to the imports included in the measure,” and if the competent authority fails to provide 
such an explanation it has failed to comply with the non-attribution requirement of Article 
4.2(b).185 The AB, therefore, concluded that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of the non-
attribution requirement of the Safeguards Agreement. 
Next the AB went on to discuss whether the USITC was required to make “redundant 
findings” by establishing for each product covered by the safeguard measures that imports from 
outside Canada and Mexico, Jordan or Israel, alone, caused or threatened serious injury. In 
reading the USITC’s report, the AB found that instead of making one determination that imports 
from outside the excluded countries alone caused or threatened injury, the USITC “made two
separate determinations - one determination that the exclusion of imports from Canada and 
Mexico would not change the ‘injury analysis’ of the USITC, and another separate determination 
that the exclusion of imports from Israel and Jordan would not change the conclusions of the 
USITC.”186 The AB then came to the conclusion that in place of the two separate determinations 
made by the USITC, excluding either Canada or Mexico, or in the alternative, Israel or Jordan, 
the agency should have provided a “single joint determination” supported by a reasoned and 
adequate explanation explicitly establishing that imports from countries other than Canada, 
Mexico, Jordan and Israel, alone, satisfied the conditions for imposing the safeguard 
184 Id. at Para. 451.
185 Id. at Para. 452.
186 Id. at Para. 465 (emphasis in original).
41
measures.187 As the U.S. failed to follow the directions from the AB in U.S. – Wheat Gluten and 
U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards, whereby a competent authority is required to establish, with a 
reasoned and adequate explanation, and “in a way that leaves nothing merely implied or 
suggested,” that imports from sources covered by the measure, alone, satisfy the requirements for 
the application of a safeguard measure, the AB found that the Panel had not required to the 
USITC to make “redundant findings,” but instead required the agency only to make the one 
requisite finding regarding imports from Canada, Mexico, Jordan and Israel.188
C. Non-attribution as an Additional Analytical Step to the Parallelism Requirement
 As mentioned above, the non-attribution principle with respect to a safeguards 
investigation has its roots in the last sentence of Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement. The 
AB elaborated on the meaning of this sentence in U.S. – Lamb Safeguards189 finding: 
As part of th[e] determination [of the existence of a causal link], Article 
4.2(b) states expressly that injury caused to the domestic industry by 
factors other than increased imports ‘shall not be attributed to increased 
imports.’ In a situation where several factors are causing injury ‘at the 
same time,’ a final determination about the injurious effects caused by 
increased imports can only be made if the injurious effects caused by all 
the different causal factors are distinguished and separated. Otherwise, any 
conclusion based exclusively on an assessment of only one of the causal 
factors – increased imports – rests on an uncertain foundation, because it 
assumes that the other causal factors are not causing the injury which has 
been ascribed to increased imports. The non-attribution language in 
Article 4.2(b) precludes such an assumption and, instead, requires that the 
competent authorities assess appropriately the injurious effects of the other 
factors, so that those effects may be disentangled from the injurious effects 
of the increased imports. In this way, the final determination rests, 
187 Id. at Para 468.
188 Id. at Para. 472 (emphasis in original).
189 United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from 
New Zealand and Australia, WT/DS177, 178/AB/R, Appellate Body Report [hereinafter U.S. –
Lamb Meat Safeguards].
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properly, on the genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect 
between increased imports and serious injury.190
The AB in U.S. – Steel Safeguards interpreted this language and Article 4.2(b) of the 
Safeguards Agreement to mean that imports from RTA partners must be investigated for their 
possible injurious effects by the competent authority as an “other factor,” whether or not they are 
included in the injury and causation investigation. This interpretation is reasonable when applied 
to the situation where imports of RTA partners are included in the injury investigation but 
subsequently excluded from the ultimate imposition of safeguard measures. As the AB found in 
U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards, in this situation, the competent authority must have “established 
explicitly, through a reasoned and adequate explanation, that imports from sources outside the 
free-trade area, alone, satisfied the conditions for the application of a safeguard measure, as set 
out in Article 2.1 and Article 4.2” in order for imports from RTA partners to be excluded from 
the safeguard measures.191
Where, however, imports from RTA partners are not included in the injury investigation, 
the AB in U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards did not explicitly require the competent authority to
investigate RTA partner imports. The decision of the AB not to require an investigation of RTA 
partner imports in this situation likely stems from the fact the such a finding would indicate that 
meeting the requirements of the Safeguards Agreement is more important than respecting the 
elimination of “duties and other restrictive regulations” requirement of Article XXIV.192 By 
190 See U.S. - Steel Safeguards, WT/DS248-249, 251-254, 258-259/AB/R, Appellate Body 
Report at FN 449 (quoting from U.S. – Lamb Meat Safeguards at Para. 179) (emphasis in 
original).
191 U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 198
(emphasis added).
192 See id. (declining to prejudge whether Article 2.2 allows Members to exclude RTA partner 
imports from the scope of a safeguards measure). 
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asserting that imports from RTA partners always be considered “other factors,” whether or not 
such imports are included in the injury investigation, the AB in U.S. – Steel Safeguards, 
therefore, has, in fact, added an additional analytical step to the parallelism requirement. 
According to the non-attribution standard of Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement 
coupled with past AB decisions, it may be reasonable to assume the U.S. – Steel Safeguards AB 
decision was correct in asserting that imports from RTA partners must always be considered 
“other factors” under the non-attribution standard as laid out in U.S. – Lamb Meat Safeguards.
This interpretation, however, undermines past AB decisions regarding the “parallelism 
requirement” and GATT Article XXIV by supporting the non-attribution requirement in favor of 
the ability of WTO Members to effectively create and administer RTAs. By not including RTA 
partners in the injury and causation investigation and the subsequent application of safeguard 
measures, the Member imposing the measures must be considered to have complied with the 
“parallelism requirement” as no impermissible “gap” between the scope of the investigation and 
the scope of the application of the measures would exist. According to past AB decisions Article 
XXIV should be available as an affirmative defense to GATT-inconsistent measures (e.g. where 
MFN is violated by applying safeguards measures only to Members outside an RTA) when a 
Member has met the “parallelism requirement.”193
As the AB found in U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards, Members should be afforded the 
opportunity to present an affirmative defense under Article XXIV to exclude imports from RTA 
partners from the investigation and ultimate application of safeguard measures where they can 
193 See, e.g., Turkey – Textiles, WT/DS34/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 45 (concluding 
that Article XXIV can be used as a defense to certain GATT-inconsistent measures), U.S. – Line 
Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 198 (affirming that Article 
XXIV can be used to argue an exception to Safeguards Agreement Article 2.2 in two 
circumstances).
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fulfill the requirements of Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement by demonstrating that 
imports from non-RTA member countries, alone, are causing or threatening to cause serious 
injury to a domestic industry.194 As discussed in Turkey - Textiles, such a defense would require 
the Member to demonstrate: 1) that the RTA seeking to exclude members has met the 
requirements of Article XXIV:(5)(a) and (8)(a), and 2) show that the formation of the RTA 
would have been blocked had the measure at issue not been included.195 Again, this situation 
may pose a problem for the AB because if it finds that a Member has complied with the 
“parallelism requirement” it would then have to inquire into whether the RTA mets  the 
requirements of Article XXIV. 
The obligation that Members respect the non-attribution standard even where RTA 
partner imports have been excluded from the injury and causation investigation will allow the 
AB to again evade the true issue of whether the RTA meets the requirements of Article XXIV. 
By following U.S. – Steel Safeguards, the AB now has the ability to decide that the competent 
authority, even though it excluded RTA partner imports from the injury and causation 
investigation and subsequently found that imports from sources outside the RTA, alone, met the 
requirements for imposing safeguard measures, failed to “establish explicitly through a reasoned 
and adequate explanation” that imports from RTA partners did not significantly factor into the 
injury suffered by the domestic industry. This additional step leaves the door open for the AB to 
rule that a Member has failed to meet the “ parallelism requirement” as the competent authority 
194 U.S. – Line Pipe Safeguards, WT/DS202/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 198.
195 See Turkey - Textiles, WT/DS34/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 58 (finding an Article 
XXIV affirmative defense to a GATT-inconsistent measure to include 1) the party invoking the 
defense must first demonstrate that the RTA has met the requirements of Article XXIV, and 2) 
that party must also show the measure was necessary to the formation of the RTA).; See also 
Argentina - Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, Appellate Body Report at Para. 109 (reaffirming 
Article XXIV affirmative defense as reasoned in Turkey - Textiles). 
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did not consider imports from RTA partners as “other factors.” The AB can, therefore, once 
again decide that it cannot rule on whether the Member can be afforded an Article XXIV defense 
allowing the exclusion of RTA partners from safeguard measures as the Member failed to meet 
the “parallelism requirement.”
IV. Conclusion
As has been demonstrated, three themes can be gleaned from Panel and AB Reports 
regarding the ability of RTA partners to exclude each other from the application of safeguard 
measures. First, there must not be an impermissible “gap” between those countries involved in a 
safeguards investigation and those countries upon which the measures are applied unless a 
“reasoned and adequate explanation” for the exclusion is provided. Second, Article XXIV, under 
certain circumstances, may provide a defense to measures that are GATT-inconsistent. And 
third, the AB has made several explicit refusals to rule on whether Article XXIV can provide a 
defense to the Agreement on Safeguards.
The AB in U.S. – Steel Safeguards, however, departed from the above themes, at least as 
to the situation where RTA partner imports are excluded from the safeguards injury and 
causation investigation all together, by requiring the competent authority to consider RTA 
imports as “other factors” under the non-attribution standard. In future attempts by RTA partners 
to exclude each other from the application of safeguards measures, therefore, the AB has the 
ability to again refuse to rule on whether there is an Article XXIV defense available if the RTA 
member has not “established explicitly through a reasoned and adequate explanation” that the 
imports from its RTA partners were not attributed to the injurious effects of the imports being 
investigated, a tough and ambiguous standard to say the least.
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The Article XXIV defense appears not to be a policy consideration the AB is willing to 
rule on anytime soon. Although the WTO continues to support the formation of new RTAs and 
allows old ones to operate without technical approval of the CRTA, the AB has decided not to 
extend to them the ability to exclude each other from the application of safeguard measures. By 
continuing to accept the rigorous “parallelism requirement,” the AB has been able to evade 
ruling on a tough issue that has increasing implications throughout the WTO as more and more 
Members seek to regionalize trade. 
